On Peut Se Tutoyer - French Expression Explained

Expression: On peut se tutoyer ?Pronunciation: [o(n) peu seu tu twa yay]Meaning: Can we use tu with each other?​Register: informal Explanation French makes an important distinction between  tu, the informal you, and vous, the formal you. There are even verbs: tutoyer means to use tu and vouvoyer means to use vous. Deciding whether to use ​tu or vous can be difficult for non-native speakers, and then even when you do choose correctly, you sometimes need to make a switch. Thats where the French expression on peut se tutoyer comes in.Some situations, such as a meeting between friends of friends, are borderline. The French feel that maybe they should use vous but would prefer tu. In order to avoid offense, theyll ask on peut se tutoyer  ? Another common scenario occurs when you start out using vous with someone and eventually become friends — at some point youll want to make the switch to tu. Variations: Peut-on se tutoyer  ? On se tutoie  ?

The Kwakiutl Of The North Pacific Coast - 1290 Words

The Kwakiutl of The North Pacific Coast is a group that encompases many distinct and extraordinary aspects of a North American native culture. Setting The Kwakiutl mainly reside in the geographical region of the North Pacific Coast. Stretching along the coast of present day British Columbia. This area begins near the southern border of Alaska; from the Juan de Fuca Strait and extends down south to Yakutat Bay. This region is overlaid with a diverse landscape that has greatly impacted the Kwakiutl way of life. The multitude of resource available to the Kwakiutl has prominently sustain practically every aspect of their culture and society. The ever changing layout of this area created an impenetrable home for the Kwakiutl to inhabit. The coast is shattered with numerous islands and key rivers such as the Columbia, Salmon, and Bella Coola. This opens up a system of travel, commerce, and also creating very strict opportunities for other cultural influences. With the surrounding area thick in dense forests and rugged terrain that includes mountain ranges to valleys rich with life sustaining variables such as wild game, plants, timber, and potential settlement. This varied landscape also greatly isolated the Kwakiutl, making it difficult for any outside influences or possible threats to their way of life, F. Boas 1966, page 7. With the vast variety of natural resources this area offers it has abundantly supported the needs to sustain a way of life for the Kwakiutl. NumerousShow MoreRelatedTotem Poles1130 Words   |  5 PagesPeople believe that totems originated around the Northwest Pacific Coast where Native Americans had specific rules and traditions about how they were made and used. Although no one knows for sure how long the Native Americans have been living in the North America region, it is known that their culture is very much centered around their spiritual beliefs as individual families and clans. Despite the common belief that totem poles represent Native American gods, in many tribes they were used to representRead MoreKwakiutl Tribal Mask of the Pacific Northwest Essay1099 Words   |  5 PagesThe Kwakiutl Indian tribe existed before the discovery of North America by the European culture and inhabited the coast of the Pacific Northwest of the United States and British Columbia in Canada. The tribe is rich in tradition and culture and has remained steadfast in their beliefs, history, teachings and artisan skills which have been passed down generation to generation. The artisans in the Kwakiutl tribe mastered the art of creating special ceremonial masks that are not only beautiful and aestheticallyRead MoreMy Visit to the American Museum of Natural History Essay3048 Words   |  13 PagesThe three Halls that I visited at the American Museum of Natural History were: Halls of the Pacific Peoples, Northwest Coast Indians and Asian peoples. All of these Halls were distinctly different from each other, although I enjoyed viewing all three, my favorite Hall was that of Asian Peoples. Of special interest was the Hall of Northwest Coast Indians, since I was able to witness and play in my head, a reel of the transformations it has gone through since the time of Franz Boas, as described

Midterm Paper free essay sample

He would have to endure the stares and the stories of his paralyzed imbs. The moral issue of discharging Dawson from the hospital should be considered because he is suspected of leaving and committing assisted suicide due to his quadriplegic condition. In the case of the baby, the moral issue is also of quality of life. The mother has decided to not have the surgery performed and have nutrients taken away from her child. The baby has lived for less than ten hours and obviously cannot yet make a decision for herself. If the surgery was to be performed and the baby fully recovered, the quality of life would still come into play. Because she does not know how it is to ive with working limbs, she would be able to cope and learn how to function better than in Dawsons case. Although she would be would most likely cope better without limbs, the question arises of What would she be able to do on her own? She would need someone to be with her at all times: to feed her, bath her, go to the restroom with her, dress her, and all other everyday tasks. Thus, the quality of life in this child should be considered when deciding if she should have the surgery to remove the anomalies or not. Previously, the Metropolitan Hospital board had agreed to refrain rom providing breathing assistance and/or nourishment for people who have so stated their wishes. Thus, in this case of Roosevelt Dawson, he has previously met with both his mother and his social worker discussing his choices as to what his options were after he is discharged from the hospital. This can create a legal issue due to the fact that Dawson was originally going to be able to be discharged from the Metropolitan Hospital. If the Metropolitan Hospital were to refrain from discharging Dawson, then that could cause some disagreements with Dawsons wishes and the ants of his social worker and his physicians. Dawson has also been found completely competent, which can provide stability to his life after his current stay at the hospital and thus strengthen his case to leave. Regarding the case of the baby girl, it has been stated, in our text, that contemporary ethical and legal norms hold that all human beings born alive should be treated equally, regardless of disability. This can call for a legal case because if this baby girl were to have been born with legs and arms, would the mother still not want surgery performed? And if she did not ish to have surgery, then that would call into her competence and if she were able to make a proper decision about the situation? If all human beings born alive should her baby girl? Thus, because the mother is not treating her child as if she were a baby without a disability, the hospital can be accused of following through with the wishes of an incompetent woman. According to the Child Abuse Amendments (CAA) of 1984, which ended the political controversy over the federal role in decisions to withhold treatment from handicapped newborns, legal issues could arise from the ospital not treating the baby. This amendment strongly protects the rights and interests of those with disabilities and leaves little room for non-treatment decisions to be based on expected low quality of life or the interests of parents. All children, whatever the extent of their disabilities, are to be granted medical treatment unless they met the narrowly defined exceptions. Also, in our text, at the very least, CAA could be perceived as setting the standard of care to which hospitals and doctors would be held, both by accrediting bodies and by courts hearing challenges to ontreatment decisions. The baby girl case has similarities with the case of Miller v. HCA, in our text. In this Texas Supreme Court decision, while recognizing that parents ordinarily have the right to consent to or to refuse medical care for their children, the court also recognized that an exception to the parental consent requirement arises when an emergent condition exists and treatment must occur immediately to prevent the death of the child. Although, in Miller v. HCA, the court found that the doctors initial resuscitation in Miller was Justified because the situation was an emergency nd there was not enough time necessary to get consent form the parents or from a court. The court only found the doctors actions rationalized because the doctor did not have enough time to consult with the parents before making the life or death decision. In this case, the physician has time to get consent from the mother, which could then be argued, that if the neonatal team would have been taking action without the mothers consent, and would not be Justified. The two cases of Roosevelt Dawson and the baby girl have a several significant similar qualities to them: loss of imbs, the quality of their lives would be questionable, and both Dawson and the baby have other parties trying to make a life or death decision for them. In terms of quality of life, Dawson is a recent quadriplegic patient and the baby girl has been born without limbs. When calling into account the quality of their lives without limbs, should the baby have surgery and Dawson leave the hospital, could be considered of extremely difficult quality of life. Finally, Dawsons social worker is pushing a court order for Dawson to stay in the hospital and not be discharged, while the babys eonatal staff is pushing a court order to disregard the mothers decision on not having the baby undergo surgery and removing the nutrients currently being given. Although there are some similarities surrounding the cases of Dawson and the baby, there are positively some differences that cannot go unmentioned. Firstly in the case of Roosevelt Dawson, he is a twenty-one year old completely competent male, wishing to leave the hospital. But, according to his social worker, he is has the intentions of assisted suicide. In the case of the baby, she is a less than ten hour old female. She cannot take nourishment orally because she has anomalies of the mouth and throat, which can be surgically removed. Her mother is refusing to give the neonatal staff permission for surgery and has asked the hospital not to nourish her baby girl. Because the baby cannot make a decision for herself, her mother is her making specific differences between them, how they should be handled, and how their physicians should interact with both them and their families. In order to relate to the patients in these cases, there are four types of physician-patient relationship models hat should be considered. The first type of relationship representation is the paternalistic model. According to our text, this model ensures that the patients receive the interventions that best promote their health and well being. In other words, the physician is acting as a guardian to the patient strongly suggesting or telling the patient what the best option for him or her would be in that particular scenario. The second type of relationship model is called the informative model. Here, the objective of the physician-patient interaction is for the physician to provide he patient with all relevant information, and the patient selects the option they want, and the physician follows through with their wishes. A fairly to-the-point model: provide the information, make a decision, act accordingly. The third model is the interpretive model. The aim for this model is to illuminate the patients values and what he or she actually wants, and to help the patient select the available medical interventions that realize their values. This model is more interpretive, the physician tries to assess the patients core values and help them make a decision after considering them. Lastly, is the deliberative model with the goal of this model is to help the patient determine and choose the best health-related values that can be realized in the clinical setting. In this model, the physician would suggest the best option for the patients health, not considering any moral values, but only those that would be best clinical wise. Considering all the types of physician-patient relationships explained in the previous paragraph, the best relationship that should be established in the case of Roosevelt Dawson should be the interpretive model. This model would best fit Dawsons case because he needs to know what he values. Because what he values (could be his life, family, friends, functioning limbs) could have him change his mind in wanting to be discharged. Because what would be best for his health and therefore his values, could be to have him stay in the hospital or at home with a physician assisting him and his family. Thus, if he were to realize that his moral values were to stay alive, then the best way to do that would be to listen to the physicians around him. The type of relationship that should be established in the baby girls case should e the paternalistic model. This is because in this model, the physician would act as the babys guardian and implement what is best for the babys life and has obligations, including that of placing the babys interest above his or her own and soliciting the views of the mother, who seems to lack adequate knowledge of the situation. This is the best model for this case because the physician would initially be the guardian for the baby, rather than the mother, and will thus make the best decision for the baby and disregard the views of the mother. To keep in mind moral utonomy when assessing the physician-patient relationships is vital. Moral autonomy is defined in our text as: to act freely, is to act autonomously; to act according to a law you give yourself and not according to the desires of nature or pleasure; and to respect each persons liberty to self-determine their own idea of the looking at various perspectives. Dawsons choice to leave the hospital relates to his ability to act freely; if he does in fact wish to commit assisted suicide, it is to act according to a law he has given unto himself. Thus, to respect each persons liberty to elf-determine their own idea of the good is to respect Dawsons idea that being discharged from the hospital is his best option.

What Do You Think Is the Most Powerful Objection to the Ideal Observer Theory Essay Example

What Do You Think Is the Most Powerful Objection to the Ideal Observer Theory? Essay Firth’s Ideal Observer Theory suggests that an ethical statement like â€Å"x is right† means, â€Å"any Ideal observer would react to x† (Firth, P. 209) by producing an alpha reaction. The following are the characteristics of an Ideal Observer: Omniscient with respect to the non-moral facts, omnipercipient, disinterested, dispassionate, consistent and â€Å"normal†. In this essay, I will attempt to explain and justify why opposition to the â€Å"omniscience† characteristic is the most powerful objection to the Ideal Observer Theory, while construing possible rebuttals for Firth. To begin with, Firth made â€Å"omniscient with respect to non-ethical facts† a characteristic of an Ideal Observer because â€Å"we regard one person as a better moral judge than another if, other things being equal, the one has a larger amount of relevant factual knowledge than the other. † (Firth, 1970: P. 212) Also, Firth specified about being omniscient with respect to non-ethical facts seeing that rational procedures are vital to an Ideal Observer for deciding ethical questions, but â€Å"there are many ethical questions which cannot be decided by inference from ethical premises† (Firth, P. 13), meaning that ethical facts are not essential, while non-ethical facts are. As mentioned before, the larger amount of relevant factual knowledge one possesses enables him to be regarded as a better moral judge. If so, then why did Firth make the Ideal Observer omniscient when grasping all the relevant facts is adequate? This is because Firth believes that the notion of relevance cannot be â€Å"employed in defining an ideal observer,† (Firth, P. 213) as, by pointing out that some facts are irrelevant, we will also be specifying that an Ideal Observer’s alpha reaction would be the same whether or not he possesses such facts. We will write a custom essay sample on What Do You Think Is the Most Powerful Objection to the Ideal Observer Theory? specifically for you for only $16.38 $13.9/page Order now We will write a custom essay sample on What Do You Think Is the Most Powerful Objection to the Ideal Observer Theory? specifically for you FOR ONLY $16.38 $13.9/page Hire Writer We will write a custom essay sample on What Do You Think Is the Most Powerful Objection to the Ideal Observer Theory? specifically for you FOR ONLY $16.38 $13.9/page Hire Writer As an entailment, â€Å"in order to explain what we mean by relevant knowledge, we should have to employ the very concept of Ideal observer which we are attempting to define. † (Firth, P. 212) In other words, to identify what facts are relevant would make the theory circular. Therefore, Firth just allows the ideal observer to have all knowledge (omniscient), as â€Å"there is no other practicable way of specifying which facts a person must know in order to know all the ethically relevant facts, without circularity (Brandt, P. 410). Plus, there does not seem to be anything wrong with including this extra knowledge. As the reasons why Firth made the Ideal Observer omniscient are demonstrated, it would be interesting to look at the objections against this characteristic of his theory. To begin with, objectors might argue that the feature of omniscience is not compatible with human beings. They would say that it is impossible for a person to learn all facts or grasp all knowledge, unless he is a god. Therefore, such a requirement for Firth’s theory would entail that there are actually no Ideal Observers at all. However, Firth could possibly reply by saying that it is metaphysically possible for a human to grasp all knowledge. Currently, human beings have only used up 3% of their brains capacity, so you cannot deny that there is the possibility that human beings can comprehend the truth of all propositions. Perhaps all the knowledge combined will not be able to use up the full capacity of the brain. Plus, one cannot deny the possibility that god can create an omniscient human being. Against such a reply, people would say that the creation of an omniscient human being is impossible because a finite brain cannot grasp an infinite number of propositions. Since Firth had wrote in his article â€Å"omniscience implies complete knowledge of the past as well as the future†. (Firth, P. 213) The future is infinite, propositions in the future are also infinite, and therefore eventually it will reach a point where the finite brain will no longer be able to take in additional propositions. To refute such a counterargument, Firth would probably say that it is possible for god to create a human being that has a brain with infinite capacity, entailing the possibility for the being to be omniscient. The omniscience condition of Firth’s Ideal Observer Theory remains valid. Apart from the argument that omniscience is incompatible with human beings, objectors could also contend that the feature of omniscience â€Å"eat away at the human characteristics of the Ideal Observer. † (Brandt, p. 409) This means that the Ideal Observer would no longer experience certain feelings that human beings usually have. Examples of these feelings would be the shock from winning a lottery, disappointment and despair from knowing that you have cancer, or anxiety that is aroused due to ignorance of the future, like not knowing the result of your job interview. This also conflicts with the 6th condition of the Ideal Observer Theory that suggests that the Ideal Observer would be â€Å"normal†, he would be a person, and â€Å"not a superman or a super-natural being. † (Martin, P. 4) When the omniscience characteristic of the Ideal Observer allows him to know every single proposition, including the ones in the past or future, how much of a person can he be, it would seem to most people that the Ideal Observer is more like a superman. And when all those feelings like shock, disappointment and anxiety are absent in the Ideal Observer, people would question, how much of him can actually be â€Å"normal†? This argument, combined with the previous one, brings out the question – â€Å"Apart from god, is there a being that actually answers to the description of the Ideal Observer theory? † As a rebuttal towards this objection, Firth could probably argue by saying that whether something answers to the theory’s description is irrelevant, the purpose of his theory is to discover the truth of an ethical statement like â€Å"x is right†, and whether an Ideal Observer actually exists should be separated from the issue. Furthermore, another criticism can be made against Firth by saying that the omniscience feature overlaps with the omnipercipience feature of the theory. The idea of omnipercipience is that â€Å"it’s not enough just to know that someone is in pain; rather one must have a sense of the pain, or know what it’s like to feel the pain. † (Martin, P. 3) Objectors would argue that such sensory feelings can already be experienced by the Ideal Observer if he is omniscient, the first hand experience of someone’s pain is also one of the infinite propositions that an omniscient Ideal Observer would â€Å"know†. Therefore, objectors would argue that the omnipercipience condition could have just collapsed into the omniscience one, and it is now repetitive with the first condition overlapping with the second. In order to address such a criticism, Firth could probably reply by emphasizing the importance of the omnipercipience condition, wrong acts like murdering are committed because the criminal cannot imagine the pain of the victim. If the murderer had any sense of how much pain he inflicted, he never would have acted so! † (Martin, p. 3) It is true that the omniscience condition includes the omnipercipience condition, but people might overlook this important feature if Firth collapsed the two conditions into one. Therefore, he could refute the criticism of him being repetitive by saying that the overlapping is actually good because it makes sure that no one fails to notice the significance of the omnipercipience condition. By separating this condition from the omniscience condition, his theory would be more explicit and less prone to misunderstanding. Finally, the last objection to the omniscience feature of the Ideal Observer Theory is that it does not actually avoid circularity. Although the omniscience condition was originally used as a means to avoid circularity, objectors could say that even if the Ideal Observer is omniscient, he must still make his judgment (x is right) on the basis of all and only the relevant facts. As shown before, identifying which facts are relevant requires the conception of the Ideal Observer Theory to be employed and at the same time it is this very conception that we are trying to define. (Circularity) Therefore, since the judgment is made on the basis of all and only the relevant facts, it is circular and the omniscience feature does not actually avoid this problem. To address this last objection, Firth would probably reply in two ways. First of all, he would refute by saying that there is no need for the Ideal Observer to have any information of relevance, or to know what facts are actually relevant. He can argue that the judgments that an Ideal Observer makes constitute rightness and wrongness within it, therefore all the judgments he makes are by definition right, meaning that he does not need to have any knowledge of relevance at all. However, this argument is very prone to opposition, objectors would argue that Firth inserted the feature of omniscience to ensure that the Ideal Observer knows which facts are relevant. If you say that he does not need any information of relevance at all, then he does not need any knowledge! Therefore, if the Ideal Observer does not have information about relevance, he is no better than a person that knows nothing. This means that there is no reason for us to accept the definition of â€Å"right† from such an unknowledgeable Ideal Observer. This defeats the purpose of Firth’s theory because it was meant to formulate a satisfactory analysis of ethical statements. The second reply that Firth might give is that it is possible to include relevance in a non-circular way while defining the Ideal Observer. If a non-circular way to identify relevant facts can be specified, the problem will be fixed because objectors are saying that the omniscience feature does not actually avoid circularity. However, the objectors can also easily counter this claim. They could simply argue that this option is not open to Firth because he himself said that the Ideal Observer could not know the relevant facts without circularity. To say that the ideal observer knows that a particular fact is not relevant to an ethical judgment is to say, assuming that an absolutist dispositional analysis is correct, that he would know that his dispositions to make the particular judgment would be the same whether or not he possessed that particular fact. † (Firth, P. 212) Since the replies that Firth would probably propose could be countered, and I cannot think of how Firth coul d possibly recounter them. This justifies why I think that this is the strongest opposition to Firth’s Ideal Observer Theory. By suggesting that the omniscience feature does not get rid of the circularity problem, it actually puts Firth into a dilemma. Since he cannot specify relevant facts in a non-circular way, he either has to allow his theory to be rejected as circular, or he has to reject that the Ideal Observer needs any information of relevance, but that would entail that his Ideal Observer is no better than someone that is totally unknowledgeable, hence his theory would be unworthy as an analysis of an ethical statement, as demonstrated above. To recapture, I have shown that people would argue against the omniscience feature of Firth’s Ideal Observer Theory in a few ways. However, it is only the last objection, which says that omniscience does not actually avoid circularity, that Firth would be unable to resolve, and it would even put him into a dilemma which either makes his theory rejectable as circular or unworthy as an analysis of ethical statements. For this reason, I would say that it is the strongest objection to Firth’s Ideal Observer Theory. References Brandt, Richard. (1950) The Definition of an Ideal Observer Theory in Ethics, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XV, 414-421. Firth, R. (1970). â€Å"Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer†. In W. Sellars J. Hospers (Eds. ), Readings in Ethical Theory (pp. 200 – 221). Appleton-Century-Crofts. Martin, M. R. (2010). Theories of Morality: Lecture Notes for Topic 7 (Ethical absolutism and the Ideal Observer Theory. ) What Do You Think Is the Most Powerful Objection to the Ideal Observer Theory Essay Example What Do You Think Is the Most Powerful Objection to the Ideal Observer Theory? Essay Firth’s Ideal Observer Theory suggests that an ethical statement like â€Å"x is right† means, â€Å"any Ideal observer would react to x† (Firth, P. 209) by producing an alpha reaction. The following are the characteristics of an Ideal Observer: Omniscient with respect to the non-moral facts, omnipercipient, disinterested, dispassionate, consistent and â€Å"normal†. In this essay, I will attempt to explain and justify why opposition to the â€Å"omniscience† characteristic is the most powerful objection to the Ideal Observer Theory, while construing possible rebuttals for Firth. To begin with, Firth made â€Å"omniscient with respect to non-ethical facts† a characteristic of an Ideal Observer because â€Å"we regard one person as a better moral judge than another if, other things being equal, the one has a larger amount of relevant factual knowledge than the other. † (Firth, 1970: P. 212) Also, Firth specified about being omniscient with respect to non-ethical facts seeing that rational procedures are vital to an Ideal Observer for deciding ethical questions, but â€Å"there are many ethical questions which cannot be decided by inference from ethical premises† (Firth, P. 13), meaning that ethical facts are not essential, while non-ethical facts are. As mentioned before, the larger amount of relevant factual knowledge one possesses enables him to be regarded as a better moral judge. If so, then why did Firth make the Ideal Observer omniscient when grasping all the relevant facts is adequate? This is because Firth believes that the notion of relevance cannot be â€Å"employed in defining an ideal observer,† (Firth, P. 213) as, by pointing out that some facts are irrelevant, we will also be specifying that an Ideal Observer’s alpha reaction would be the same whether or not he possesses such facts. We will write a custom essay sample on What Do You Think Is the Most Powerful Objection to the Ideal Observer Theory? specifically for you for only $16.38 $13.9/page Order now We will write a custom essay sample on What Do You Think Is the Most Powerful Objection to the Ideal Observer Theory? specifically for you FOR ONLY $16.38 $13.9/page Hire Writer We will write a custom essay sample on What Do You Think Is the Most Powerful Objection to the Ideal Observer Theory? specifically for you FOR ONLY $16.38 $13.9/page Hire Writer As an entailment, â€Å"in order to explain what we mean by relevant knowledge, we should have to employ the very concept of Ideal observer which we are attempting to define. † (Firth, P. 212) In other words, to identify what facts are relevant would make the theory circular. Therefore, Firth just allows the ideal observer to have all knowledge (omniscient), as â€Å"there is no other practicable way of specifying which facts a person must know in order to know all the ethically relevant facts, without circularity (Brandt, P. 410). Plus, there does not seem to be anything wrong with including this extra knowledge. As the reasons why Firth made the Ideal Observer omniscient are demonstrated, it would be interesting to look at the objections against this characteristic of his theory. To begin with, objectors might argue that the feature of omniscience is not compatible with human beings. They would say that it is impossible for a person to learn all facts or grasp all knowledge, unless he is a god. Therefore, such a requirement for Firth’s theory would entail that there are actually no Ideal Observers at all. However, Firth could possibly reply by saying that it is metaphysically possible for a human to grasp all knowledge. Currently, human beings have only used up 3% of their brains capacity, so you cannot deny that there is the possibility that human beings can comprehend the truth of all propositions. Perhaps all the knowledge combined will not be able to use up the full capacity of the brain. Plus, one cannot deny the possibility that god can create an omniscient human being. Against such a reply, people would say that the creation of an omniscient human being is impossible because a finite brain cannot grasp an infinite number of propositions. Since Firth had wrote in his article â€Å"omniscience implies complete knowledge of the past as well as the future†. (Firth, P. 213) The future is infinite, propositions in the future are also infinite, and therefore eventually it will reach a point where the finite brain will no longer be able to take in additional propositions. To refute such a counterargument, Firth would probably say that it is possible for god to create a human being that has a brain with infinite capacity, entailing the possibility for the being to be omniscient. The omniscience condition of Firth’s Ideal Observer Theory remains valid. Apart from the argument that omniscience is incompatible with human beings, objectors could also contend that the feature of omniscience â€Å"eat away at the human characteristics of the Ideal Observer. † (Brandt, p. 409) This means that the Ideal Observer would no longer experience certain feelings that human beings usually have. Examples of these feelings would be the shock from winning a lottery, disappointment and despair from knowing that you have cancer, or anxiety that is aroused due to ignorance of the future, like not knowing the result of your job interview. This also conflicts with the 6th condition of the Ideal Observer Theory that suggests that the Ideal Observer would be â€Å"normal†, he would be a person, and â€Å"not a superman or a super-natural being. † (Martin, P. 4) When the omniscience characteristic of the Ideal Observer allows him to know every single proposition, including the ones in the past or future, how much of a person can he be, it would seem to most people that the Ideal Observer is more like a superman. And when all those feelings like shock, disappointment and anxiety are absent in the Ideal Observer, people would question, how much of him can actually be â€Å"normal†? This argument, combined with the previous one, brings out the question – â€Å"Apart from god, is there a being that actually answers to the description of the Ideal Observer theory? † As a rebuttal towards this objection, Firth could probably argue by saying that whether something answers to the theory’s description is irrelevant, the purpose of his theory is to discover the truth of an ethical statement like â€Å"x is right†, and whether an Ideal Observer actually exists should be separated from the issue. Furthermore, another criticism can be made against Firth by saying that the omniscience feature overlaps with the omnipercipience feature of the theory. The idea of omnipercipience is that â€Å"it’s not enough just to know that someone is in pain; rather one must have a sense of the pain, or know what it’s like to feel the pain. † (Martin, P. 3) Objectors would argue that such sensory feelings can already be experienced by the Ideal Observer if he is omniscient, the first hand experience of someone’s pain is also one of the infinite propositions that an omniscient Ideal Observer would â€Å"know†. Therefore, objectors would argue that the omnipercipience condition could have just collapsed into the omniscience one, and it is now repetitive with the first condition overlapping with the second. In order to address such a criticism, Firth could probably reply by emphasizing the importance of the omnipercipience condition, wrong acts like murdering are committed because the criminal cannot imagine the pain of the victim. If the murderer had any sense of how much pain he inflicted, he never would have acted so! † (Martin, p. 3) It is true that the omniscience condition includes the omnipercipience condition, but people might overlook this important feature if Firth collapsed the two conditions into one. Therefore, he could refute the criticism of him being repetitive by saying that the overlapping is actually good because it makes sure that no one fails to notice the significance of the omnipercipience condition. By separating this condition from the omniscience condition, his theory would be more explicit and less prone to misunderstanding. Finally, the last objection to the omniscience feature of the Ideal Observer Theory is that it does not actually avoid circularity. Although the omniscience condition was originally used as a means to avoid circularity, objectors could say that even if the Ideal Observer is omniscient, he must still make his judgment (x is right) on the basis of all and only the relevant facts. As shown before, identifying which facts are relevant requires the conception of the Ideal Observer Theory to be employed and at the same time it is this very conception that we are trying to define. (Circularity) Therefore, since the judgment is made on the basis of all and only the relevant facts, it is circular and the omniscience feature does not actually avoid this problem. To address this last objection, Firth would probably reply in two ways. First of all, he would refute by saying that there is no need for the Ideal Observer to have any information of relevance, or to know what facts are actually relevant. He can argue that the judgments that an Ideal Observer makes constitute rightness and wrongness within it, therefore all the judgments he makes are by definition right, meaning that he does not need to have any knowledge of relevance at all. However, this argument is very prone to opposition, objectors would argue that Firth inserted the feature of omniscience to ensure that the Ideal Observer knows which facts are relevant. If you say that he does not need any information of relevance at all, then he does not need any knowledge! Therefore, if the Ideal Observer does not have information about relevance, he is no better than a person that knows nothing. This means that there is no reason for us to accept the definition of â€Å"right† from such an unknowledgeable Ideal Observer. This defeats the purpose of Firth’s theory because it was meant to formulate a satisfactory analysis of ethical statements. The second reply that Firth might give is that it is possible to include relevance in a non-circular way while defining the Ideal Observer. If a non-circular way to identify relevant facts can be specified, the problem will be fixed because objectors are saying that the omniscience feature does not actually avoid circularity. However, the objectors can also easily counter this claim. They could simply argue that this option is not open to Firth because he himself said that the Ideal Observer could not know the relevant facts without circularity. To say that the ideal observer knows that a particular fact is not relevant to an ethical judgment is to say, assuming that an absolutist dispositional analysis is correct, that he would know that his dispositions to make the particular judgment would be the same whether or not he possessed that particular fact. † (Firth, P. 212) Since the replies that Firth would probably propose could be countered, and I cannot think of how Firth coul d possibly recounter them. This justifies why I think that this is the strongest opposition to Firth’s Ideal Observer Theory. By suggesting that the omniscience feature does not get rid of the circularity problem, it actually puts Firth into a dilemma. Since he cannot specify relevant facts in a non-circular way, he either has to allow his theory to be rejected as circular, or he has to reject that the Ideal Observer needs any information of relevance, but that would entail that his Ideal Observer is no better than someone that is totally unknowledgeable, hence his theory would be unworthy as an analysis of an ethical statement, as demonstrated above. To recapture, I have shown that people would argue against the omniscience feature of Firth’s Ideal Observer Theory in a few ways. However, it is only the last objection, which says that omniscience does not actually avoid circularity, that Firth would be unable to resolve, and it would even put him into a dilemma which either makes his theory rejectable as circular or unworthy as an analysis of ethical statements. For this reason, I would say that it is the strongest objection to Firth’s Ideal Observer Theory. References Brandt, Richard. (1950) The Definition of an Ideal Observer Theory in Ethics, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XV, 414-421. Firth, R. (1970). â€Å"Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer†. In W. Sellars J. Hospers (Eds. ), Readings in Ethical Theory (pp. 200 – 221). Appleton-Century-Crofts. Martin, M. R. (2010). Theories of Morality: Lecture Notes for Topic 7 (Ethical absolutism and the Ideal Observer Theory. )